
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"Secretary of State Henry Klasinger's assurances to European diplomats here that the Arab summit in Rabat last month would follow his grand design came in the face of oblique but persistent intelligence warnings that a disaster might be in the making.,

one connorcing pseudo-ravii uio repeated pledge of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat that the Rabat confer- Ado not know what Kissinger himself ence would nobjundermine 'Jordan's ." King Hussein and hence Kissinger's salami tacties in pressing intransigent Israel to make successive small withdrawais from Arab land seized in 1867. That policy went bankrupt the moment Hussein lost his authority to ne gotiate with Israel on the West Bank.

Kissinger flatly informed the West ern European allies of the United split from Washington on Middle East policy—that Sadat had given him a 'pledge" on the outcome of the fatal that a bandly constable to desiver of privately cited as one more piece of evidence that Rissinger is over extended in singlehandedly conducting every aspect of American foreign policy.

The cataclysmic set back for the United States resulting from the Arab : ... decision to bypass Husseln and designate Yasses Arafat as Israel's bargaining partner on the Tarzeli-occupied West Bank of the lorden is a showcase example.

Despite the veiled intelligence warnings that the Rabat meeting might not come out roses for the United States,

the State Department never conducted. a single; serious, advance appraisal of the political forces arrayed against Sadat. Middle-level experts at State never, attempted to analyze whether Sadat could really hold the Kissinger line. No papers were drafted, no dis-

sion was that middle-level diplomats knows, or one-quarter of it, about their own areas of responsibility_Many U.S. ambassadors, find themselves, in the same boat. Since they are not privy to Kissinger's private talks with heads of state, they are not equipped to make serious estimates based on their ownforeign sources.

U.S. diplomats who regularly tap opinion at the United Nations, for ex-Arafat hard line that came thundering out of Rabat. But since U.S. policy toward Rabat was being handled secretly the bouton the mignistener state with that pleage it now being widely but a partment officials—seemed superflu-

> A different and less serious crisis of diplomacy stemming from Kissinger's monolithic grip on policy was the in-ability of the U.S.; delegation to the World Food Conference to define the administration's anti-famine plan before Kissinger touched down at Rome to announce it—in his speech, Indeed, Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz was so angered at what he regarded as being upstaged by Kissinger that his wife boycotted Kissinger's speech and went shopping.

"There were 20 congressmen in Rome for that conference," one U.S. official told us, "but they had no idea what our policy would be because Henry was traveling in Asia." The Kissinger speech was extremely well-reesixed by the conversion but an anonof U.S. farmers and the game plan changed.

With Richard Nixon in the White House, centralization of foreign policy worked well, sometimes miraculously. But that has changed. When Kissinger returned from his long trip to Asia, Europe and the Middle East, he had to plunge into double-digit hours of Oval Office cram talks to prepare an untutored President Ford for Japan, South Korea and Madiyostok, He sendwiched cago on how the oil-consuming nations could escape bankruptcy....

eaSarionancii Uriansarha isalichad tha umphs with some envy now watch the Kissinger setbacks with a mixture of alarm and anger. They are alarmed because they fear Kissinger has too much influence with a President lacking strong foreign policy convictions of his own or an independent national. security staff in the White House. They are angry because they think the-Secretary of State, strong man of a weak cabinet, has become too much a one-man show, without a President or, a bureaucracy capable of double-checking his decisions.

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